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In re Crow Water Compact, 364 P.3d 584 (Mont. 2015) 
 
Ariel Overstreet-Adkins 
 
 In re Crow Water Compact is the second appeal from the Crow 
Water Compact, agreed upon by the Settling Parties to distribute and 
manage water rights amongst themselves. The decision upholds the 
negotiated Compact for the second time, affirming the Montana Water 
Court’s decision granting summary judgment to the Settling Parties over 
objections by the Objectors and approving the Compact by a final order. 
This decision represents the last step in a process, started in 1979, to define 
and quantify the reserved water rights for current and future uses of the 
Crow Nation in Montana.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
At issue in In re Crow Water Compact was whether the Montana 
Water Court applied the proper legal standard of review in approving the 
Crow Water Compact (“Compact”) in the final order and whether non-
tribal water users (“Objectors”) met their burden of proof under that 
standard of review.1 Further, the Objectors asserted that their due process 
rights were violated during the Compact negotiation process.2 The 
Montana Supreme Court held that the Water Court applied the proper 
standard for determining the reasonableness of the Compact, and that the 
Objectors failed to establish that the Compact was unreasonable and would 
adversely affect their interests.3 The Court also held that the Compact 
negotiation process did not violate the Objectors’ due process.4  
 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
  The United States, the Crow Tribe, and the State of Montana 
(“Settling Parties”) negotiated the Compact to determine the Crow Tribe’s 
water rights in relation to the rights of both the United States and the State 
of Montana.5 The Settling Parties quantified the Tribe’s rights using the 
Practicably Irrigable Acreage (“PIA”) standard established in Greeley v. 
                                                          
1.  In re Crow Water Compact, 382 P.3d 584, 585 (Mont. 2015) 
[hereinafter Crow II]. 
2.  Id.  
3.  Id. at 587-88. 
4.  Id. at 591. 
5.  Id. at 586 (citing In re Crow Water Compact, 354 P.3d 1217, ¶¶ 17-
18 (Mont. 2015) [hereinafter Crow I]). 
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Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes.6 During negotiations, the Settling 
Parties settled on the Tribe’s PIA and water entitlement under Winters v. 
United States.7 The Settling Parties agreed on the volume of water the 
Tribe would receive and listed the water rights by basin in Article III of 
the Compact.8 First, from the Big Horn River Basin, the Tribe has a 
500,000 acre-feet per year (“AFY”) natural flow right.9 The United States 
also conditionally granted the Tribe 300,000 AFY from its water right in 
Bighorn Lake.10 Second, the Settling Parties agreed that the Tribe has “all 
surface flow, groundwater and storage” rights in the other Compact-
covered basins.11 Third, the Tribe agreed to reserve 250,000 AFY between 
the Yellowtail Afterbay Dam and the diversion facility at Two Leggins for 
fish and recreational purposes.12 
 
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
 
In 1999, the Crow Tribe, the United States Department of the 
Interior, and the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission 
agreed to the Compact terms.13 The Montana Legislature ratified the 
Compact that same year, codifying it as Montana Code Annotated § 85–
20–901.14 In 2011, the members of the Crow Tribe voted to ratify the 
Compact.15 The Water Court entered a preliminary decree reflecting the 
terms of the Compact in 2012, as required by Montana Code Annotated § 
85–2–231.16 Over 16,000 people and entities received notice from the 
court and 100 objections were filed, 15 of which were maintained 
throughout the process.17 On May 27, 2015, the Water Court dismissed the 
remaining objections and approved the Compact in a final decree without 
alteration per the requirements of Montana Code Annotated § 85–2–233.18 
The appeal arose from concerns by the Objectors who claimed the 
                                                          
6.  Id. (citing State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai 
Tribes, 712 P.2d.754, 764 (Mont. 1985); In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use 
Water in the Gila River Sys. and Source, 35 P.3d 68, 77–78 (Ariz. 2001)). 
7.  Id. (citing Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577–78 (1908)). 
8.  Id. 
9.  Id. 
10.  Id. 
11.  Id.  
12.  Id. 
13.  Id. at 585-86. 
14.  Id. at 586. 
15.  Id.  
16.  Id.  
17.  Id.  
18.  Id. 
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Compact would adversely affect their interests as neighboring land and 
water rights owners.19  
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
The Court addressed three main issues raised by the Objectors on 
appeal.20 First, the Objectors claimed that the Water Court improperly 
applied a legal standard by requiring the Objectors to prove injury from 
the application of the Compact.21 Second, the Objectors raised a number 
of issues relating to the extent of their injury from the Compact’s 
operation.22 Third, the Objectors claimed that the Compact negotiation 
process violated their due process rights.23 
 
A.  Water Court’s Standard of Review 
  
The first issue addressed by the Court was whether the Water 
Court applied the proper legal standard of review in approving the 
Compact in the final order.24 The Water Court required the Objectors to 
show “material injury” in order to find the Compact unreasonable.25 On 
appeal, the Objectors argued that the correct standard was “good cause” 
and that they need only show the Compact was not “fundamentally fair, 
adequate and reasonable and conform[ing] to the law.”26  
The Court stated that the Objectors had confused the standard 
required for filing the initial objection with the standard for deciding the 
ultimate reasonability of the Compact.27 The “good cause” standard, under 
Montana Code Annotated § 85–2–233(1), is sufficient to compel the Water 
Court to hold a hearing on the Compact objections.28 The Court, in Crow 
I, noted the correct standard, stating: 
  
[T]he court’s intrusion upon what is otherwise a private 
consensual agreement negotiated between the parties to a 
lawsuit must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a 
                                                          
19.  Id. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. at 587. 
25.  Id. 
26.  Id. (quoting Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City and 
Cnty. of S.F., 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. 
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reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product 
of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the 
negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a 
whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.29 
 
The Court noted that the Water Court has adopted “complementary 
standards” in reviewing compacts, specifically noting the Chippewa Cree 
Compact and the Fort Peck Compact.30 When dealing with objections from 
parties who did not participate in the compact negotiation process, the 
Water Court first examines if “the decree was the product of good faith, 
arms-length negotiations,” and if so, the “negotiated decree is 
presumptively valid and the objecting party has a heavy burden of 
demonstrating that the decree is unreasonable.”31 If the Water Court finds 
that “the decree was the product of good faith, arms-length negotiations,” 
the burden of proof on the objector shifts to require a showing that the 
decree is unreasonable.32 In the Chippewa Cree and Fort Peck Compact 
cases, the Water Court required the objectors to show that their interests 
were “materially injured by operation of the Compact.”33 Because the 
Water Court applied this analysis and standard in this case, the Court found 
“no error in law.”34 
 
B. Unreasonableness of the Compact and Material Injury 
 
The second issue addressed by the Court was whether the 
Objectors met their burden of proof under the “unreasonable” and 
“material injury” standard correctly applied by the Water Court.35 The 
                                                          
29.  Id. (quoting Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 625; discussing Crow I, 
354 P.3d at ¶ 16) (bracket in original). 
30.  Id.  
31.  Id. (quoting United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir. 
1990) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
32.  Id. (quoting Oregon, 913 F.2d at 581 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). 
33.  Id. (citing In the Matter of the Adjudication of the Existing and 
Reserved Rights to the use of Water both Surface and Underground, of the Chippewa 
Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy’s Reservation within the State of Mont., No. WC–2000–
01, 2002 WL 34947007, *6 (Mont. Water Ct. June 12, 2002) (mem. op.); In the Matter 
of the Adjudication of the Existing and Reserved Rights to the use of Water both 
Surface and Underground, of the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian 
Reservation within the State of Mont. in Basins 40E, 40EJ, 400, 40Q, 40R & 40S, No. 
WC–1992–01, 2001 WL 36525512, *7 (Mont. Water Ct. Aug. 10, 2001) (mem. op.). 
34.  Id.  
35.  Id.  
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Court presumed the Compact valid because the Objectors did not 
challenge that it was negotiated at arm’s length and in good faith.36 The 
Objectors’ burden, then, was to show that the Compact was unreasonable 
and that their interests were materially injured.37 The Objectors raised 
three specific issues in their effort to meet this burden.38 First, the 
Objectors argued that the Compact did not follow precedent established 
by Winters.39 Second, Objectors argued that because the Compact “give[s] 
all the water in the smaller drainages to the Tribe and authoriz[es] the Tribe 
to enter any land for diversion purposes,” it violated their property rights.40 
Third, Objectors argued the Compact was unreasonable because it closes 
basins that injure the Objectors, over-appropriated water or failed to 
quantify water appropriated to the Tribe or both, and Montana negotiated 
the Compact contrary to public interest.41 The Court found that the 
Objectors failed to meet their burden to show the unreasonableness of the 
Compact and material injury to their interests.42  
First, the Court held that the Objectors failed to show how the 
specific grant of 300,000 AFY storage right in Big Horn Lake was beyond 
the legal authority of the federal government to make under Winters 
because their arguments were based on speculation.43 The Court stated that 
“substantial evidence exists to demonstrate that return flow from Tribal 
diversions does not reduce the amount of water available downstream.”44 
Further, the Court emphasized, “Objectors have sufficient water for their 
own diversions.”45 The Court also rejected the Objectors’ challenge to the 
47,000 AFY allocated to the Tribe for coal mining purposes on the Ceded 
Strip, because this allocation was within the Winters rights as well as a 
result of the result of arms-length negotiations by the Settling Parties.46  
Second, in response to Objectors’ property rights argument, the 
Court stated plainly: “[t]he Compact does not compromise state-based 
water rights.”47 The Court noted that state water rights with priority dates 
prior to 1999—the priority date of the Tribal Water Rights based on the 
date the Compact was ratified by the Montana Legislature—were 
                                                          
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. at 587-88. 
38.  Id. at 588. 
39.  Id.; see Winters, 207 U.S. 564. 
40.  Crow II, 382 P.3d at 588. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. at 591. 
43.  Id. at 588. 
44.  Id. 
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. at 589. 
47.  Id. 
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protected from assertions of senior priority by the Tribe.48 The Court 
stated, “[t]he amount of water available to pre–1999 state law rights is 
protected and certainly not materially injured by the Compact.”49 Further, 
the Court noted that the Compact did not authorize the Tribe to take water 
from the Objectors and in times of shortage and the Objectors could 
enforce their rights with the state agencies and state courts under state 
law.50 Also, the Court stated that “[t]he Compact does not permit the 
unconditional entry of the Tribe onto private land.”51 Under Article IV of 
the Compact, the Tribe must have the owner’s permission or some other 
legal authority to enter private fee land.52 
Third, the Court rejected the Objectors’ claims about the 
Compact’s unreasonableness.53 The Court found that the closure of basins 
“does not compromise Objectors’ rights,” rebuffing Objectors’ argument 
that the Compact would “freeze these basins in time, effectively 
disallowing ‘progress based on technology, improved practices, changes 
in irrigation and livestock methods and methodology.’”54 The Court 
reiterated the Water Court’s finding that the Objectors did not have a 
property interest in “future appropriations or changes in use,” and further 
stated that the Compact allows changes in use and transfer of state water 
rights so long as the change “does not adversely affect an existing use of 
a Tribal water right.”55 Regarding the Objectors’ over-appropriation 
argument—specifically the 250,000 AFY for maintenance of the fishery—
and claim that the Compact negotiation was contrary to the public interest, 
the Court found that “allocation of water for public recreation and 
maintenance of aquatic life is not inconsistent with the public interest.”56 
 
C.  Due Process 
 
 The third issue addressed by the Court was if the negotiation 
process of Compact violated the Objectors’ right to due process.57 The 
Objectors claimed they did not have a “meaningful opportunity to be 
                                                          
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. at 590. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. 
53.  Id. 
54.  Id. 
55.  Id. (citing Seven Up Pete Venture v. Montana, 114 P.3d 1009, 1017 
(Mont. 2005); MONT CODE ANN. § 85-20-901 (1999). 
56.  Id. at 590-591. 
57.  Id. at 591. 
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heard.”58 The Court stated that the record showed that the Compact 
negotiation sessions were open to the public, drafts were noticed and made 
public for review, and the Montana Legislature held public meetings and 
solicited comments from the public.59 The Court held that because 
Objectors had opportunities to be heard, the Compact did not violate their 
due process rights.60 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Court affirmed the Montana Water Court’s final order.61 In so 
doing, the Court approved the standard of review applied by the water 
court in this and previous compacts. This decision should provide certainty 
to tribes such as the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribe, which will 
be going through a similar process for final approval of its water compact, 
about what it can expect in proceedings in front of the Montana Water 
Court.   
 
                                                          
58.  Id. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. 
